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Abstract. We analyse post-war Dutch migration to New Zealand. We docu-
ment that history, reﬂect on analytical and econometric modelling and then
combine a sample of Dutch migrants in New Zealand with a representative
sample of Dutch in The Netherlands to estimate wage equations and the
determinants of the migration decision. We use the results for ex post evalu-
ation of the migration decision.
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1. Motivation and general framework
Analyses of the economic situation of immigrants commonly focus on their
situation in comparison to natives of the destination country. While this is a
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relevant perspective for research on the labour market in the receiving coun-
try, it is not the natural focus for the migrants themselves. One may assume
that their decision to emigrate was not motivated by a comparison with
natives in the destination country, but by comparing their perspectives at
home with those for themselves in the destination country. The perceived
welfare of natives in the destination country will no doubt affect the
expectations of potential migrants. Still, their basic comparison will be
between their own homeland position and the position in the destination
country. In this paper, we propose to share that perspective. That will make
the outlook quite similar to the standard approach in labour market
(or geographical) mobility within a country: compare the alternatives of
moving and non-moving and assess or explain the decision that has been
made by the individual, i.e. to move or not to move.
In this paper we will attempt to assess the consequences of migration deci-
sions by Dutch migrants to New Zealand. Did they fare well? Was it a good
decision to emigrate, or had they better stayed at home? Obviously a question
that is easier posed than answered, because many factors can be important
in the individuals’ own assessment, and we may lack the information to
take all these factors into account. There are many dimensions to such a
comparison. The core of the decision is on the maximum attainable utility in
each country, reﬂecting individuals’ optimising behaviour. The optimisation
should cover the full scope of individual choices: labour force participation,
self-employment versus employment, type of job, labour effort, contribution
to and beneﬁts from the public sector (taxes, subsidies, social insurances, etc).
The migration decision will relate to the individual’s endowments and the
opportunity to derive welfare from them in both countries: the social, eco-
nomic and institutional framework, the uncertainty of realising potential, and
tastes, including risk attitudes.
The full conceptual framework is clearly too broad and wide-ranging to
apply directly in a single estimation model. The data requirements are too
extensive for structural estimates of individual decisions. Obviously, strong
simpliﬁcations are inevitable. But one should keep this framework in mind
when analysing the data and interpret estimation results. We will describe the
history of Dutch migration to New Zealand in the next section, and then
in Sect. 3, we discuss some more formal modelling, in Sect. 4 we describe
the data, in Sect. 5 we present an econometric model and in Sect. 6 we dis-
cuss the results. In Sect. 7 we draw the conclusion to our lead question. We
will stress that, although correcting for selectivity bias in estimated earnings
seems an obvious necessity, it is actually a futile exercise in the present con-
text.
2. Postwar history of Dutch migration to New Zealand1
Figure 1 shows the inﬂow of Dutch migrants into New Zealand in the post-
war period (data from Priemus 1997). In the late forties, there was a some-
what complicated start, with a few immigrants from Holland, and a few from
Indonesia. In October 1950, a Migration Treaty was signed between the gov-
ernments of New Zealand and the Netherlands. The governments would
share in moving cost for selected migrants aged between 18 and 35, who in
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return would have to perform a job assigned to them by the New Zealand
government for 2 years. New Zealand would set a quota, 1200 men and 800
women for the ﬁrst year. Immigration rapidly increased, even surpassing the
quota, and New Zealand tightened selection in response. Participation in the
Assisted Migration Program, as it was called, diminished, from 55% of
immigrants in 1953 to 11% in 1958, because immigrants disliked the two year
job assignment and because the Dutch government implemented a general
subsidy for emigration in 1955, and the New Zealand government partici-
pated in this program. In 1956, 90% of the immigrants were subsidised; the
percentage would remain that high for a long period.
Between 1955 and 1957, the Nomination System was introduced.
Churches, business ﬁrms and the Dutch Emigration Service were allowed to
have families immigrate, provided they guaranteed work and housing. The
New Zealand government set an annual quota of 1000 immigrants without
any further restrictions. The quota usually was not exhausted, except in the
early 1980’s when the recession hit particularly hard in the Netherlands and
the unemployment rate soared up.
In 1993, the Dutch government denounced the Migration Treaty, as emi-
gration policy was abolished as a government activity. As a consequence,
Dutch applicants for immigration were subject to the general system that
selects on the basis of points awarded for age, education and experience. By
that time, Dutch immigration had already steadily diminished.
Priemus (1997) notes that entrants were carefully selected, initially by the
New Zealand authorities under the Assisted Migration Program and later by
the Dutch under the Nomination System (under this system, an unsuccessful
immigrant returned to Holland at Dutch expense). It was certainly not only
farmers who emigrated to predominantly agricultural New Zealand.2 While
the percentage was indeed 43% in 1950, it was down to 16% in 1951 and to
only 7% in 1962. The share of farmers among the Dutch is now comparable
to that among the New Zealanders (some 12%). Dutch immigrants are and
have been overrepresented in manufacturing and construction and under-
represented in commerce. The share of self-employed is quite high, at 24% of
those fully active in 1981, with a comparable 13% for the entire New Zealand
active population. Unemployment among the Dutch was generally low, and
Fig. 1. Dutch immigrants entering New Zealand. (Source: Priemus 1997)
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there was some consensus notion that the Dutch work hard and do well.
Supported both by New Zealand and by Dutch policies, the Dutch were keen
on integration in the New Zealand society; geographically, they were spread
all over New Zealand, and they made little attempt to cluster together. Dutch
immigrant associations in 1997 only numbered some 1700 members at a total
Dutch born population of 25 000. Only a small minority of the second gen-
eration speaks Dutch.
As the data show, in all some 41 000 Dutch immigrated to New Zealand
between 1947 and 1997. The Dutch immigrant population numbers about
25 000 in 1997. Over the postwar period 3 000 Dutch have died in New
Zealand. Hence, out of the 41 000 some 13 000 have left the country, many
going back to Holland, but others moving on to other immigration countries
like Australia or Canada.
Elich and Blauw (1981) is the only study that looks speciﬁcally at Dutch
return migration from New Zealand. In 1980, they traced the return migrants
from two emigrant cohorts and found that about a third had returned to
Holland (36% for the 1970 cohort and 33% for the 1975 cohort). The esti-
mate of a third squares nicely with the aggregate estimate cited above and
also suggests that most return migration takes place in the ﬁrst 5 years. Their
combined Canada/Australia/New Zealand sample is strongly unimodal at
about 3 years after migration.
Elich and Blauw asked the returned migrants for their motives to return.
‘Personal problems’ (problems with relatives back home, with the part-
ner, children, or language) are altogether mentioned by 51% of the returned
migrants. Among stated motives, lack of economic success is not dominant.
64% evaluate their migration positively and their return not negatively. Only
8% ex post regret their migration, 18% regret having returned. If one were
to take these answers at face value, there would be no need for great concern
for selective return migration if one studies economic success. But of course,
stated motives may not tell the true story.
As Fig. 2 shows, per capita growth in The Netherlands was much stronger
than in New Zealand, in particular up to the late 1970’s. This has contin-
uously undermined the position of New Zealand as an attractive destination
for Dutch emigrants motivated by material welfare. New Zealand relative
national income after 1975 hovered around a third of its 1950 value. The
index of the real exchange rate (Dutch guilders per New Zealand dollar
multiplied by New Zealand over Dutch price level) mirrored this develop-
ment quite faithfully. The Dutch who moved to New Zealand in the early
ﬁfties moved to a high income country; if they stayed, this advantage was
more than wiped out over the next decades. Those who came later, moved
from a high income to a low income country.
Income dispersion may be a particularly relevant variable to understand
mobility patterns. Economic opportunity, the possibility to realise the market
value of endowments and acquired skills, may differ substantially between
countries, and a crude indication of such opportunities is given by measures
of income dispersion. It has been predicted that migration from high dis-
persion to low dispersion countries will primarily consist of low skilled
workers, since they in particular stand to gain from the move, while migra-
tion from low dispersion to high dispersion economies should be dominated
by high skilled workers. Income inequality in the Netherlands is well docu-
mented3, but data on New Zealand only start in 1984. The evidence suggests
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that New Zealand has a more unequal distribution than the Netherlands.
Atkinson et al. (1995) give data on disposable income per equivalent adult.
P10, the income at the lowest decile relative to the median, is 61.5 in the
Netherlands and 53.6 in New Zealand (in 1987), and P90 is 175.0 for the
Netherlands and 186.6 for New Zealand, giving P90=P10 ratio’s of 2.85 and
3.48.
Sylvia Dixon (1998) documents earnings inequality in New Zealand for
the period 1984–1997. Inequality in hourly earnings clearly is trended
upward during that period, both for men and for women. Applying similar
calculations for The Netherlands4 shows that in the late 1980’s and mid
1990’s, inequality is higher in New Zealand. For emigration after the late
1980’s one would thus predict it to be predominantly from the top end of
the earnings distribution, as they would have better opportunities in New
Zealand than in The Netherlands. Expenditures on social programs among
the non-aged amounted to 3% percent of GDP in New Zealand (in 1979),
and over 12% in the Netherlands (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997; Chart 2).
This suggests better social protection at the low end in The Netherlands, and
also would favour emigration from the top end rather than from the
bottom end. It is hard to assess the situation in earlier decades, for simple
lack of data for New Zealand. For The Netherlands, we know that inequality
between the 1950’s and the late 1980’s has declined substantially. In fact,
Gould (1982, pp 32–36) presents some evidence that up until the 1970’s
income inequality was larger in The Netherlands than in New Zealand.
This would c.p. predict migration to be from the low end of the Dutch skill
distribution.5
The development in aggregate unemployment rates only started to diverge
after the mid-eighties. Until that time, both rates were low, with the Dutch
rate consistently above the New Zealand rate. After the late seventies, both
rates soared up, but the Dutch rate took a sharp decline after 1984 and since
1989 is substantially lower than in New Zealand. We would expect the
Fig. 2. Nominal per capita income in New Zealand relative to nominal per capita income in The
Netherlands and real exchange rate
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relative unemployment rates also to be an important determinant of the
emigration ﬂows.
3. Analysing the migration decision: the role of age
In a present-value-maximizing framework, the comparative statics of the
migration decision are fairly staightforward.6 However, the effect of age is
not unambigious, in contrast to the genreal intuitive notion that migration, if
considered at all, should be undertaken as young as possible. This is not true
in general. We will spell out the effect of age in some detail and also focus on
it in our empirical analysis.
With A for age at migration, WHt for wage in homeland Holland at age t,
WZAt for wage in destination New Zealand at age t when migrating at age A,
and deﬁning C as the monetary equivalent of the once-over utility effect of
moving to the destination country, the present value for working in the
homeland until A and then emigrating reads
PVA ¼
ðA
O
WHte
qt dtþ
ðT
A
WZAte
qt dt CAeqA ð1Þ
To ﬁnd the optimum planned migration age, set the derivative to A equal to
zero and rewrite:
WHA þ q C
0
A
CA
 
CA
 
eqA ¼WZAAeqA 
ðT
A
@WZAt
@A
eqt dt ð2Þ
The left-hand side gives the marginal beneﬁt of increasing A: staying longer
in Holland gains the extra wage (discounted) and postpones the incurrence
of migration cost CA. The marginal cost of later migration, at the right-hand
side, entails not receiving the New Zealand starting wage WZAA reduced by
the effect of later migration on later wages (which is usually negative, hence
the marginal cost is increased by additional reduction of all future wages
in the destination country).
Equation (2) allows for many results and all of them may have empir-
ical validity, depending on the actual circumstances. There may be corner
solutions. Marginal beneﬁt may always be higher than marginal cost, and
hence, there will be no migration: postponing migration always adds more
in the homeland than in the destination country. Or the other way round:
later migration always gives higher marginal cost than marginal beneﬁt, and
migration takes place at age zero. Or the curves may cross twice. Marginal
cost, starting below marginal beneﬁts, may be low initially if the starting
wage in the destination country is not too high, increase rapidly because
of the discounted total wage loss from later migration and then decrease
because discounting dominates. Migration would then be planned at the
ﬁrst crossing.
A ‘‘well-behaved’’ interior optimum is also conceivable. Marginal beneﬁts
starting out above marginal cost may decline if a high discount rate outstrips
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wage growth in the homeland. Marginal cost may increase if post-migration
wages fall steeply with later migration. Under special conditions, there is even
a very elegant implication. Suppose that destination country wages are not
sensitive to age at migration (i.e. the term under the integral is zero). Then,
the optimal age at migration is located where the wage gap WZAA WHA
equals the return on the migration cost CA : q reduced by relative change in
migration cost:
WZAA WHA ¼ q C
0
A
CA
 
CA ð3Þ
There is international evidence that immigrant wages upon entry typically
show a dip relative to natives’ wages that may be made up in subsequent
years. We can easily include this effect, by rewriting the destination wage as a
maximum potential wage at the earliest possible migration and a loss relative
to that wage. The former may be equal to the natives’ wage, but it need not.
Hence, let’s decompose the immigrant’s wage proﬁle in a wage that would
be realised at age t if migrating at A ¼ 0 ðWZtÞ and a loss that is a fraction of
this wage: dA; f, the fraction of this wage lost at age f when arriving at age
A. dA;A is the initial dip, dA; f decreases for increasing f and reaches zero at
Aþ F (where F is the time needed for catching up). Of course, Aþ F may be
greater than T (age of retirement), and the wage never fully catches up. But
for the case where Aþ F < T, and dA;AþF ¼ 0 can be realised, we may write
condition (2) for optimum planned age at migration as
WHA þ q C
0
A
CA
 
CA
 
eqA ¼ ð1 dAAÞWZAeqA þ
ðAþF
A
WZt
@dAt
@A
eqt dt
ð4Þ
Again, the outcome is not obvious. The unspeciﬁed age sensitivity of wages
combined with discounting makes for unpredictable outcomes7. The impact
of the Entrant wage loss on the optimal migration age depends on the
relative magnitude of initial loss and cumulated later loss. Without Entrant
loss (dst ¼ 0, all s, t) and without migration cost ðCA ¼ 0Þ, in a well-behaved
interior solution, the planned migration age would be at WHA ¼WZA,
assuming WZA (marginal cost) increases faster than WHA (marginal beneﬁt):
move as soon as the destination wage surpasses the homeland wage. The
initial earnings dip dAA reduces marginal cost, and hence increases planned
age of migration. But later losses ðdAtÞ increase the marginal cost, and
hence, decrease planned migration age. The unpredictable balance of the two
determines the outcome.
As noted, there is a general, intuitive notion that migration if consid-
ered at all, is best undertaken at the youngest possible age (e.g. straight
after completing education, although education of course may also be
completed abroad). But as the above analysis indicates this holds only under
restrictive conditions8. For example, Schwartz (1976) indeed predicts that
the rate of migration declines with age. But he imposes that the beneﬁt
from migration at a given age (the difference between the wage rate in both
countries) declines, at every age, for any postponement of migration. This
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condition appears not to be met in our data (see later). We will return to the
age-effect in our empirical section. The effect of age on migration turns out to
be complicated, and can only be predicted under very speciﬁc conditions,
even in a deterministic framework. It may differ between different types of
potential migrants, such as migrants between countries with very large wage
differentials (the initial New Zealand-Netherlands comparison) and potential
movers in an international professional labour market such as now emerging
in the European Union.9
4. Data and descriptive analysis
The Dutch dataset is the OSA sample, a national representative house-
hold panel survey. Within each household all members aged between 16
and 64 were interviewed. The panel started in 1985. Attrition has been
countered by selective addition of households to maintain a representative
sample of the Dutch labour force. The 1986 sample contains 2452
households. We will use the 1986 sample, to match the New Zealand
dataset for that year.
The New Zealand dataset is derived from the 1986 Population Census. It
includes the whole population of working age migrants (those aged 15–64),
and a 5% random sample of the New Zealand born working age population.
Immigrants are identiﬁed by their country of birth rather than by their resi-
dence status (i.e. they could have adopted New Zealand citizenship, be per-
manent residents or on temporary permits). Visitors are excluded from the
sample. We preferred the 1986 Census to later Census years, since most
Dutch immigration took place in the 1950s and the number of enumerated
Dutch migrants declines steadily over time (The overall number of Dutch
working age immigrants fell from 20196 in 1986 to 15153 in 1996).
The sample distribution by year of arrival is fairly uniform except for a
marked peak in the period 1951–1954. The age distribution by arrival year as
we observe it in our sample is transformed asymmetrically by mortality and is
Fig. 3. Sample mean age at arrival by year of arrival (Dutch working-age immigrants in 1986
census)
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truncated because of the age restriction in the sample (15–64). This is shown
clearly in Fig. 3. For arrival cohorts between the mid-forties and the mid-
seventies, the average age at arrival is quite stable at about 20–22. For older
and younger arrival cohorts the sample truncation ages affect the average
age. For older cohorts still to be in the sample, they must have come at
younger and younger ages (if you go backwards), for more recent cohorts
they cannot be included if they are too young. For older cohorts, average age
moves up from the upper boundary constraint, for younger cohorts average
age moves up from the lower boundary. Conditioning on arrival cohort
we observe that most immigrants have come at young ages. But there is still a
fair amount of dispersion and the arrival age is not uniquely low as for
example schooling ages are. In the latest cohort (arrival between 1977 and
1986), almost 30% of the immigrants arrived at ages above 34. The ‘‘moving
boundary’’ does not create an additional problem of endogenous sample
selection. The only endogenous sample selection rule is the immigration
decision. A person born before 1922 cannot be in the immigrant sample in
1986, because he is then over 64. Anyone born after 1972 cannot be in the
sample, because in 1986 he is under 15. But those born before 1922 or after
1972 cannot be in the non-migrant sample either, for the same reason. There
is no additional endogenous selection problem.
The samples are characterised in the Appendix. The Dutch in New
Zealand are old both relative to Dutch in The Netherlands and to the
native New Zealanders, reﬂecting the presence of a large stock of older
immigrants, i.e. the reduction of immigration ﬂows in later years. On
average the immigrants have been in New Zealand for some 22–23 years.
The Dutch in New Zealand work substantially more hours than the Dutch
in the Netherlands, reﬂecting their adjustment to the New Zealand standard.
The immigrants are disproportionately selfemployed, calling for separate
analyses of employees and selfemployed. They also have lower unemploy-
ment rates than native New Zealanders. Similarly, male migrants have on
average a substantial income advantage of 16 log-points over native men.
For women, the opposite is observed as the average income of a migrant
woman is 7 log-points below the income of a native woman. These com-
parisons are problematic, of course, as they are not adjusted for differences
in age, education, and other factors. Also, a direct comparison between
Dutch and New Zealand income is not meaningful, ﬁrst, because incomes
are measured in local currency, and second, because Dutch numbers give
gross monthly income whereas the New Zealand numbers give the gross
annual income.
The share of Dutch male immigrants in agriculture is much higher than in
The Netherlands, but it is quite close to the New Zealander’s share. Female
immigrants are more active in agriculture than native New Zealand women.
The Dutch in New Zealand have substantially less education than the Dutch
in the Netherlands. This ﬁts in with the hypothesis on the relation between
the skill level of migrants in relation to income dispersion. Since schooling
levels have risen considerably over time, we considered education levels by age
interval, and then the relation still holds: in all intervals, migrants have less
education than non-migrants.
In our empirical analyses, we will only consider employees. We are
compelled to ignore the issue of selectivity as an employee rather than being
self-employed. The dataset simply does not contain variables that relate to
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self-employment status without affecting earnings. Moreover, properly
measuring earnings from self-employment is quite problematic.
5. Empirical modelling of migrants’ wages: selected issues
In this section we discuss the joint modelling of wages of non-migrants (the
Dutch in the Netherlands), migrants (Dutch-born residents of New Zealand),
and the decision to migrate. A natural starting point is a canonical switch-
ing regression model with normality (e.g., Roy 1951; Quandt 1972). We show
that the extreme imbalance between migrants and non-migrants reduces the
usefulness of this model in the context of international migration. In our
view, this issue has not received sufﬁcient attention in the previous literature.
Given the empirical limitations for modelling selection on unobservables,
we then focus our analysis on measuring selection on observables. Further-
more, we introduce a non-standard model for the migration equation in form
of a discrete-time hazard model for the decision to migrate at age t. Because
for each person, calendar time and age move synchronously, the discrete-time
hazard model offers a straightforward way to introduce macro-economic
variables.
To see why the switching regression model is ill-suited in the present
context, consider the following standard set-up
WHi ¼ x 0ibH þ uHi ð5Þ
WZi ¼ x 0ibZ þ uZi ð6Þ
Mi ¼ z 0icþ ui ð7Þ
where WHi is the (logarithmic) wage in the homeland (Holland) and WZi is
the (logarithmic) wage in the destination country (New Zealand), and ui, uHi
and uZi have a trivariate normal distribution with mean vector zero and non-
zero covariances rHu, rZu and rHZ. WHi is observed for non-migrants and
WZi for migrants so that we have
Wi ¼ MiWZi þ ð1MiÞWHi ð8Þ
where Mi ¼ 1 ðMi  0Þ and Wi is the observed wage. Unless there is statis-
tical independence between the error in the migration equation and the error
in the wage equation, separate estimation of each wage equation on the sub-
set of observed wages will produce biased estimates of b. Two-stage or FML
estimation of the joint model avoids this bias. Moreover, it potentially pro-
vides valuable information on the type of selection on unobservables. This
information can be of substantive independent interest (i.e., as it may reveal
something about the ‘‘quality-effects’’ of immigration policy). Of course, all
inferences depend on the validity of the maintained model. As we show now,
the model may be seriously deﬁcient if the size of the populations observed in
each of the two regimes is very unequal.
Migration to New Zealand is a very rare event. The Netherlands have
a population of around 15 million, about 2/3 of which is of working age.
In 1986 there were approximately 20,000 Dutch working-age migrants in
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New Zealand, i.e., the ratio of migrants to non-migrants is 1–500 and the
unconditional probability of being a migrant is 0.2%. Under normality, the
expected wage in Holland for those who stay can be written as
EðWHi j ui < z 0icÞ ¼ x 0ibH 
rHu
ru
/ðz 0icÞ
1 Uðz 0icÞ
ð9Þ
where / and U are the density and cumulative density functions of the
standard normal distribution, respectively. The denominator of the last term
gives the probability of staying in Holland. It depends on the value of the
index function z 0ic. Ideally, if the migration equation could perfectly discrim-
inate between movers and non-movers, the probability should be very close
to one for those who actually stay (i.e., the index function approaches minus
inﬁnity). In the absence of good instruments, such as in the extreme case of a
constant only migration equation, the probability of staying must approach
the proportion of stayers in the population, the aforementioned 0.998, again
almost one. Moreover
lim
z 0
i
c!1
/ðz 0icÞ
1 Uðz 0icÞ
¼ 0 ð10Þ
Hence, the overall conditional expectation in Eq. (9) that is consistent with
the data approaches zero. For the typical individual, conditional and uncon-
ditional expectations are approximately the same, regardless of the correla-
tion between the migration equation and the wage equation and the quality
of the selection equation. Less formally, since most people are non-migrants,
the stayer condition ui < z 0ic cannot be very binding on average. As a con-
sequence, the conditional expectation EðuHi j ui < z 0icÞ and the marginal
expectation E½EðuHijuiÞ ¼ 0 are almost the same.
While this result does not matter much for the interpretation of the
results of non-migrants (indeed – who ever reported a national earnings
function with correction for selective outmigration?), it gives rise to extra-
ordinary counterfactual wages of movers. In particular, consider the counter-
factual wage equation of migrants had they stayed in Holland. Again, using
the standard formula, it holds that
EðWHi j uiz 0icÞ ¼ x 0ibH þ
rHu
ru
/ðz 0icÞ
Uðz 0icÞ
ð11Þ
The denominator of the second expression now gives the probability of being
a migrant. As before, the expression depends on the value of the index
function z 0ic. Two extreme cases are possible. In a ﬁrst case, the migration
equation perfectly discriminates between migrants and non-migrants. The
probability of migration for migrants is close to one, and the counterfactual
wage Eq. (11) is approximately equal to the wage of non-migrants. In prac-
tice more relevant is a second case, in which the migration equation discrim-
inates poorly between migrants and non-migrants. In the extreme, no suitable
instruments are at hand and all the selection is on unobservables. With a
constant probability of being a migrant, in our case 0.002 (the proportion of
migrants in the Dutch population), the value of the Mills ratio in Eq. (11)
exceeds 3 and selection effects are large even for moderate values of rHu=ru.
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The underlying mechanism can also be illustrated by considering the
conditional expectation function of the bivariate normal which is linear:
EðWHijuiÞ ¼ x 0ibH þ
rHu
r2u
ui
One immediate result is that if rHu is nonzero, then EðWHijuiÞ goes to neg-
ative or positive inﬁnity as ui goes to inﬁnity. In the limit, for any distribution
of z 0ic, if the probability of migration goes to zero, then only those with ar-
bitrarily large values of ui decide to migrate and the conditional expectation
will go to positive or negative inﬁnity by the linearity of the conditional
expectation for bivariate normal distributions, unless the covariance is zero.
For non-limit considerations, the magnitude of the overall selection effect
depends on the absolute value of the ratio rHu=ru. In order to calibrate a
range of possible magnitudes of this ratio, one has to be more speciﬁc about
the nature of the migration decision. In the classical Roy model, as applied
for instance by Borjas (1987) to the migration decision, people act on income
gains net of migration cost, i.e., Mi ¼ x 0i ðbZ  bHÞ  Ci þ uZi  uHi. First,
assume that migration cost are constant and that uZ and uH are perfectly
correlated, i.e. rHZ ¼ rHrZ. The latter assumption may be a reasonable
approximation for migration between two OECD countries, as conjectured
by Borjas (1987) (formally, the correlation is not identiﬁed in the switching
regression model since individuals are never observed in both states). Then
rHu
ru
¼ rHZ  r
2
H
sqrtðr2H  2rHZ þ r2ZÞ
¼ ðsgn½rZ  rHÞrH ð12Þ
In the Dutch/New Zealand scenario this means that for a value of rH ¼ 0:5,
say, the counterfactual wages of migrants in the Netherlands will be 150 log
points below or above those of an average Dutch worker. To us, such large
selection effects are completely implausible. To ‘‘rescue’’ the model, one can
introduce individual heterogeneity in migration cost, for instance due to dif-
ferences in psychological disposition. The mere geographic distance between
the Netherlands and New Zealand means that it is difﬁcult to maintain close
family ties after migration. Life-style may be a more important consideration
to others. Now
rHu
ru
¼ rHZ  r
2
H  rHC
sqrtðr2H þ r2Z þ r2C  2rHZ  2rHC þ 2rZCÞ
ð13Þ
Thus, the model can be reconciled with the data if the migration decision is
largely driven by migration cost. If migration costs have a large variance and
are mostly unrelated to wages (rHC ¼ rZC ¼ 0), then the ratio Eq. (13) will be
close to zero. But in this case, the switching regression model is driven mainly
by an exogenous factor and the case for joint estimation is less compelling in
the ﬁrst place.
To summarize, the strong assumptions of the switching regression model
with normality has implications that are a-priori implausible in our applica-
tion. One might attempt to salvage the model by choosing other error distri-
butions. We don’t think, however, that this approach is promising. Rather,
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we take the migration decision to be exogenous with respect to wages and
consequently report single equation estimates of Eqs. (5)–(7), thereby ad-
dressing the other aspect of immigration choice, selection on observables.
In doing so, we use some non-standard functions for Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) in
order to obtain as much information as possible. For migrants, we modify
the standard earnings function,
Wi ¼ b0 þ b1ysi þ b2ti þ b3t2i þ ui ð14Þ
where ‘‘ys’’ stands for years of schooling and ‘‘t’’ for age. Using the identity
t ¼ Aþ ðt AÞ, where ðt AÞ is years since migration, i.e., experience in the
New Zealand labor market, it follows that
WZi ¼ c0 þ c1ysi þ c2Aþ c3ðti  AiÞ þ c4A2i
þ c5ðti  AiÞ2 þ c6Aiðti  AiÞ þ uZi ð15Þ
This generalization makes it possible to distinguish between the returns
to experience gained in the Netherlands before migration and the returns to
experience in New Zealand, as in the model in Sect. 3. The two are the same
as long as c2 ¼ c3 and 2c4 ¼ 2c5 ¼ c6, a set of restrictions that can be tested.
In the more general model, age-earnings proﬁles depend on the age at arrival
in New Zealand, just as we discussed in Sect. 3. For instance, one can test
whether the earnings dip is larger for older migrants who experience rela-
tively faster subsequent earnings growth than younger migrants.
To explicitly account for age-dependence of the migration decision, as laid
out in Sect. 3 of our paper, we model the duration until migration using a
discrete time hazard model with time-varying covariates (e.g., Allison 1984).
The risk set includes all people of a certain age who have not yet migrated
by that age. The decision of moving to New Zealand at age A, given that a
person lived in Holland up to age A 1, is assumed to be determined by the
latent model
Mt ¼ 1 if hðAiÞ þ b1x1i þ b2x2iðAi þ ciÞ þ ui > 0 ð16Þ
hðAÞ measures the variation in the hazard over the life-cycle. Two parame-
terizations are considered. In a ﬁrst, hðAÞ is a fourth-order polynomial in A.
In a second, an age speciﬁc intercept is estimated without further restriction.
x1 are age invariant variables such as gender and education (which is
assumed to be completed before the decision to migrate is made). x2ðAþ cÞ
includes indicators of the relative economic conditions in the two countries at
the time of migration (c is the cohort (birth year) such that Aþ c is the year
of migration).
For estimation, we generate a combined sample of Dutch in the Nether-
lands and Dutch in New Zealand. The ﬁrst group constitutes the part of the
risk group that never migrated. For each age (beyond 15) a separate record is
created. For instance, for a Dutch resident aged 40 in 1986, it is known that
she did not migrate at age 20, nor at age 21, or 22 and so forth. The decision-
relevant variables at age 20 were her personal (invariant) characteristics and
the macro-conditions in 1966. The comparison group is made up of people
who did migrate at age A. These are only included once, at the age they came
to New Zealand. In principle, pre-migration observations of migrants (when
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they were aged A 1;A 2; . . .) could be included in the risk set. However,
migrants are over-sampled, whereas the Dutch sample is representative for
the population in the Netherlands, and therefore more appropriate.
6. Results
We start out, in Table 1, with a standard ‘‘assimilation’’ earnings function
for New Zealand, where we include natives and immigrants in one regression
equation, with a dummy for migrants, for men and for women.10 Returns to
schooling are about 7%. The effect of potential experience (age minus
schooling minus 6) is virtually log-linear and markedly lower for women. The
position of women further deviates from that for men with a penalty for
marriage rather than a bonus. This clearly suggests that married women are
restricted in their choices compared to single women.11
The migrant earnings dip is substantial12, at 15% to over 30%, and a
catch-up rate on years since migration that is too slow to ever really make
up for the loss13. Note that even for the best migrants, the prospects are poor.
If we take ‘‘best’’ to mean an initial earnings loss two standard deviations
smaller than the average migrant and a catch-up rate two standard deviations
higher, these ‘‘best’’ men and women would still need some 30 years of New
Zealand experience to wipe out the gap.
In Table 2 we compare earnings for the Dutch who choose to remain
in Holland and for those who migrated to New Zealand. Rates of return to
schooling are higher in Holland than in New Zealand, so we expect migrants
to be lower educated. The prediction of predominantly lower educated to
migrate is borne out in the statistics we discussed earlier. Note that the lower
returns to schooling only hold for migrants: New Zealanders in New Zealand
have a higher return than Dutch in Holland. The lower return to schooling
Table 1. New Zealand earnings functions: immigrants and natives
Men Women
Years of schooling 0.0665 0.0742
(0.0010) (0.0020)
Experience 0.0645 0.0324
(0.0009) (0.0016)
Experience squared 0.0011 0.0005
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Married 0.2073 0.2868
(0.0074) (0.0124)
Immigrant 0.1528 0.3150
(0.0154) (0.0317)
Years of migration 0.0028 0.0054
(0.0006) (0.0014)
Constant 8.3214 8.2723
(0.0128) (0.0245)
Observations 33222 24732
R-squared number of observations 0.35 0.08
Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: OSA 1986 and New Zealand Census 1986. All employees. No weights. Dependent vari-
able is logarithmic annual earnings.
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for migrants in New Zealand than in The Netherlands has an interesting
implication: the penalty for dropping out from school is lower in New
Zealand. Often, the argument is made that in countries like New Zealand,
less regulated than The Netherlands, it is easier to make a career without a
school diploma. While we have no results speciﬁcally for school drop-outs
the results suggest that in relative terms there may be some validity in the
argument. Proﬁciency in the English language is not included in the equation
as this question was not contained in the 1986 census. Moreover, we know
from the 1996 census, where a self-evaluation was given, that virtually all
Dutch immigrants claim good proﬁciency (Winkelmann and Winkelmann
1998). The marriage premium for men is lower in Holland, for women it is
higher in Holland, generating the expectation that male migrants will be
married, while female migrants will not.
Dutch experience is about equally rewarded in the Netherlands and
in New Zealand, but at a substantially lower rate for women than for men.
This implies that the migrant earnings ratio between New Zealand and The
Netherlands (New Zealand earnings at entry relative to earnings left behind
in Holland) is not sensitive to age at migration. The returns to experience
gained in New Zealand are higher than the New Zealand returns to
Dutch experience. Both for men and for women, the difference is about 1
percentage point per year. For men, age at migration has a substantial effect
on returns to New Zealand experience. As the interaction term indicates,
migrating 10 years later reduces the returns to New Zealand experience by
Table 2. Earnings functions for Dutch in The Netherlands and Dutch in New Zealanda
Men
in NL
Men
in NZ
Men
in NZ
Women
in NL
Women
in NZ
Women
in NZ
Years of schooling 0.0575 0.0454 0.0446 0.0680 0.0597 0.0586
(0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0102) (0.0062) (0.0062)
Experience 0.0488 0.0546 0.0089 0.0152
(0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0074) (0.0052)
Experience squared 0.0008 0.0009 0.0004 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Married 0.1397 0.2142 0.2128 0.2663 0.3745 0.3548
(0.0214) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0518) (0.0398) (0.0398)
NL experience 0.0522 0.0115
(0.0023) (0.0052)
NL experience squ. 0.0006 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001)
NZ experience 0.0620 0.0247
(0.0031) (0.0076)
NZ experience squ. 0.0010 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0002)
NL exp. * NZ Exp. 0.0019 0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Constant 6.3395 8.5698 8.4556 6.3220 8.4713 8.3716
(0.0450) (0.0355) (0.0395) (0.1381) (0.0861) (0.0980)
Observations 1485 6203 6203 803 3184 3184
R-squared 0.42 0.22 0.23 0.12 0.05 0.07
a Earnings in The Netherlands is monthly income in Dutch guilders, earnings in New Zealand is
annual income in New Zealand dollars. Dependent variable is log earnings. Standards errors in
parentheses.
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some 2 percentage points per year. Yet, putting all things together, in levels
there is only a modest effect of later migration (Fig. 4). For women, the effect
of later migration on earnings growth is negligible.
In Table 3 we present a probit analysis for the country of residence: the
decision to have migrated and not returned to Holland. We used population
Fig. 4. Predicted male earnings proﬁles
Table 3. Decision to emigrate at age A: probit results (discrete time hazard model; employees
only)
Men Women
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Years of schooling 0.0020 0.0019 0.0290 0.0286
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Unemployment in Holland 0.0566 0.0554 0.0428 0.0423
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0055) (0.0056)
Unemployment in New Zealand 0.0619 0.0603 0.0297 0.0285
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0114) (0.0114)
Relative income 1.7815 1.7669 1.9467 1.9636
(0.0269) (0.0268) (0.0531) (0.0535)
Occupation: professional 0.0562 0.0549 0.1710 0.1749
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0283) (0.0284)
Occupation: service 0.1011 0.1006 0.2387 0.2400
(0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0219) (0.0220)
Occupation: agriculture 0.4200 0.4176 0.3061 0.3017
(0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0415) (0.0418)
Age polynomial yes no yes no
Age dummies no yes no yes
Log-likelihood 43692.2 43595.6 13401.9 13338.9
Notes: Sample: Male, age > 15, the reference category is blue collar jobs.
All models are estimated using population weights.
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weights for the observations, as the Dutch sample of non-migrants (OSA) is
relatively much smaller than the sample of Dutch migrants in New Zealand
(see Sect. 4). As anticipated, we ﬁnd a negative effect of schooling (signiﬁcant
only for women), reinforced by the negative effect of having a professional
(high-education) occupation. Also as anticipated, we ﬁnd a strong positive
effect of having an agricultural occupation. The effect of macroeconomic
conditions in the two countries perfectly matches theoretical predictions:
unemployment in Holland stimulates emigration, unemployment in New
Zealand reduces it, and a high relative income in New Zealand also stim-
ulates emigration.
In Fig. 5, we have plotted the probability to migrate by age as implied
by the estimated probit model. Without controls, the probability peaks
just before age 25, when we standardize by taking the age effect net of
controls we ﬁnd a much ﬂatter age pattern, and a peak shifted upwards by
several years. Note that this is at variance with the notion of migrating as
young as possible, and an inclination to migrate that falls continuously with
age, as Schwartz (1976) claimed. The age effect on migration is certainly not
unequivocal, just as we anticipated in Sect. 3.
7. So, did they fare well?
With our estimation results available, we will now give a partial answer to the
question that motivated our paper: how well off is a migrant due to migra-
tion? For the wage structures observed in 1986, we calculated net present
values of lifetime wages, discounted at 10%. We use a standard immigrant:
male14, married, 10 years of schooling, migrating at age 20 in 1950. All
annual earnings are converted into Dutch guilders. The conversion factor we
use is the ratio of average nominal per capita GDP in New Zealand evaluated
at the exchange rate of the year in which earnings are assumed to have been
generated, to average nominal per capita GDP in Holland, normalized so
that the value is one in 1986 (when we observe the data). That is, we take the
Fig. 5. Probability of migration by age, polynomial
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wage structures in each country as observed in our 1986 regression and adjust
them for each country to particular years by applying the index of the coun-
try’s average income, thus assuming that nominal wage growth does not dis-
turb the 1986 wage structure. This gives us an indication of the present values
of nominal incomes that actually accrued (or would have accrued in the other
country). We don’t correct for inﬂation: in the migration analysis, only rela-
tive inﬂation in both countries is relevant, and this is accounted for in our
conversion.15 We also make a calculation where we freeze the conversion
factor at the value for 1950, the presumed year of migration: this may serve
as an indication of what migrants could have anticipated at unchanged 1986
wage structure and relative income levels constant for the rest of their work-
ing lives. Results are collected in Table 4.
Our typical male migrant may have anticipated a substantial gain in life-
time earnings from his move to New Zealand. At the wage structures in 1986
(the only ones we observed) and the conversion factor for per capita incomes
in 1950, he thought to more than double his present value. The actual
aggregate development was quite a deception, as his lifetime earnings in New
Zealand were 25% lower than he might have anticipated in 1950. Yet, over
the course of his life, the 1950 migrant is still better off, with lifetime earnings
75% higher in New Zealand than in The Netherlands. The gains in the early
years have been high enough to outweigh the strong deterioration that
occurred during the postwar period.
We have further analysed the age effect on migration in Fig. 6. In line
with the analysis of the effect of age at migration in Sect. 3, we calculated two
present values for a standard migrant (as in Table 4). For any given age at
migration A, we calculate the present value of earnings up to age A in
homeland Holland, and the present value of earnings beyond age A in desti-
nation country New Zealand (all discounted back to 0, i.e. age 20). Both
curves are calculated in their national currencies. As Fig. 6a,b indicate, pres-
ent value in Holland continuously increases with later migration, present
value in New Zealand continuously declines with later migration. Total
lifetime present value, for any age of switching from Holland to New
Zealand, depends on the conversion rate of the two currencies (the relative
weight of the two curves). In Fig. 6a, we use the 1950 conversion rate: 1 New
Zealand dollar is 5.3 Dutch guilders. At that conversion rate, lifetime earn-
ings monotonically decrease with advancing age of migration: the best
decision is to migrate when starting working life. In Fig. 6b, with the 1986
conversion rate (1 :1), lifetime earnings increase monotonically when
postponing migration: the best decision is never to migrate. Implicitly,
somewhere between 1950 and 1986 the conversion rate development switched
Table 4. Net present-values with and without migration for Dutch males aged 20 in 1950 in
Dutch Guilders
Net present value in The Netherlands 50240
Net present value in New Zealand, converted at 1950
exchange rate
118131
Net present value in New Zealand, converted at current
(yearly) exchange rates
87831
Note: Computations are based on columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 (men). The discount rate is 10%.
The hypothetical worker is married and has 10 years of schooling.
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the optimum from ‘go young’ to ‘go never’. Conceptually, as anticipated in
Sect. 3, the present value curves might have determined an interior solution
for the optimal migration age. The actual present value curves turn out to be
modestly non-linear and generate no parabolic shape for the aggregate.
The switch of the optimum decision for a typical male individual, from
migration to no migration reiterates the results we obtained earlier in this
paper, and anticipated in our introduction.16 The ex post rationality of a
1950 migrant, in spite of the clear deterioration of New Zealand’s relative
income level surprised us. Of course, the calculations are buried under a load
of special assumptions, and there may be much more individual variety than
we could uncover. As a partial check on our results, we can compare with
outcomes of a survey we organised among Dutch immigrants in New
Zealand, by including a questionnaire in the newsletter of the federation of
Dutch immigrant associations in late 1999. Unfortunately, response was
modest and heavily dominated by the retired. We will elsewhere analyse the
data in detail, but it is interesting to take a few results from that survey. The
Fig. 6a, b. Net present values, by age at migration, Netherlands and New Zealand
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sample size of the survey is 646, of which 60% had retired. Almost half of
the respondents had a position waiting for them when they moved to New
Zealand. The earnings gap relative to the position they left behind in
Holland, according to the respondent’s recollection, was very dispersed, but
fairly symmetrically so. One quarter of them answered they experienced a
drop of 25% or more, and almost another quarter gained 25% or more. 12%
stayed about even, the intervals in between each took up roughly 10% (and
15% don’t remember). Settling in certainly has not been easy, and fully three
quarters of the respondents at some point had seriously considered returning.
On average, it took respondents 6 years to get the feeling they had really
settled in. For 45% it took no more than three years, for 71% no more than
5 years. Seriously considering to return is widely dispersed over years after
arrival, but peaks at 1 year and 2 years (11% and 14%); half of the
respondents have their heartache within 5 years17 of arrival. This matches up
with the observation that most return migration takes place within 5 years of
arrival.
And how do the immigrants evaluate their move? In terms of income
and ﬁnancial wealth, the answers divide roughly equally over the three
possible answers: ‘I am better off than I would have been’, ‘about equal’, ‘I
am worse off ’. In a simple ordered probit regression, the perceived relative
ﬁnancial position deteriorates with year of arrival (holding age constant), i.e.
those who arrived later are more likely to ﬁnd themselves worse off than they
would have been in Holland. This is precisely the conclusion we draw from
Fig. 6. However, in overall quality of life, almost three quarters indicate that
they are better off, and almost a quarter feels it’s about the same as it might
have been in Holland (only 6% feels worse off ). While these answers are
obviously coloured by selectivity and cognitive dissonance, they also reiterate
the relevance of the broad comparison we set up in Eq. (1): it’s not just wages
that determine migration decisions.18 This also supports our emphasis on
‘‘migration cost’’ rather than wage in the discussion of selectivity correction.
However, including observations on such non-pecuniary cost and beneﬁts is
not easy, if only for simple lack of accessible data.
Endnotes
1 This section is based on Priemus (1997). The general history of New Zealand immigration is
reviewed and analysed in Winkelmann (2001a).
2 In the 1950’s, the big difference in industrial employment composition was for men in agri-
culture and manufacturing; the share of services was equal in both counties. For males, agri-
culture counted for 20% of employment in New Zealand in 1956, and for 13% in The
Netherlands in 1960. Manufacturing counted for 24% in New Zealand and 33% in The
Netherlands. Other shares in one-digit composition were virtually identical in both countries.
For women, the compositions barely differed between the two countries. Sources: New Zea-
land Census 1956; Netherlands Census 1960.
3 Hartog and Veenbergen (1981).
4 We are grateful to Jeroen Smits, now at NIVROM, for his calculations.
5 We are grateful to Jacques Poot, Victoria University at Wellington for this reference.
6 Theoretical analysis of migration in general is given by Borjas (1999), focussing on selectivity
effects according to the Roy model. Unobserved heterogeneity complicates the analysis. We
will consider the Roy model in Sect. 5.
7 The model is formally exactly equal to a model for the optimal planned age of maternity,
with the same problem of an initial dip AA and possible later catching up. For example,
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Wetzels (1999) predicts maximum postponement of the birth of the ﬁrst child from a model
where A;AþF ¼ 0 (always return to the no-maternity wage) and where the loss fraction AF is
not sensitive to the age at which labour market withdrawal starts (AF is not sensitive to A).
8 In CEPR Discussion Paper 2596 underlying this paper we also analysed a model where
individuals at any age decide whether to migrate or not. The same ambiquity of the age effect
results. In that model, the effect of the discount rate is also shown to be undetermined a pri-
ori.
9 It may also be different for migrants who intend to return to their homeland, but we consider
this to be less relevant for our case. On return migration, see Røed (2000) and Dustman and
Kirchkamp (2001).
10 Preferably, one would use hourly earnings as dependent variable. We did run such regres-
sions, but many wages when turned into hourly rates were implausible (from a minimum of
0.1 dollar/hour to a maximum of 800 dollar/hour. Truncation of extreme values leads to
results very sensitive to the points of truncation. We therefore decided to proceed with a
simple robust speciﬁcation. We may add that in an earlier speciﬁcation, with log hours added
as dependent variable, our ﬁnal conclusions (Sect. 7) were no different.
11 We only employ a limited number of explanatory variables, to avoid endogeneity problems as
much as possible.
12 The standard practice of interpreting predicted mean log-differences as percentage differences
in means between groups is incorrect if the groups have unequal distribution of the dependent
variable, as the transformation from mean logx to mean x is affected by dispersion of x as
well. See Winkelmann (2001b). There is some evidence that, for men, wages of Dutch
migrants are less dispersed than wages of New Zealand-born workers. The standard practice
thus tends to underestimate the true percentage difference.
13 This result is similar to Winkelmann (2000), using the same dataset.
14 In 1950, with virtually zero participation rate for married women, male earnings will domi-
nate in the migration decision.
15 Our conversion is incorrect insofar as the price ratio between tradables and non-tradables
develops differently between the two countries.
16 Anticipated lifetime present values by age (year) of migration might be included in the
migration probit. However, with relative national income per capita we already have included
a key determinant of this comparison.
17 The typing error of ‘ﬁve tears’ had great poetic charm, but alas, even when writing about
drama we have to remain clinical.
18 As pointed out to us by Jacques Poot, a study by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs (1981)
found that relative to emigrants with destination Canada and Australia, emigrants to New
Zealand put highest weight on environmental quality as a motive for their choice.
Comparing migrants to non-migrants 703
References
Allison PD (1984) Event History Analysis. Sage University Papers series on Quantitative Appli-
cations in the Social Sciences, 07-046, Sage, Beverly Hills
Atkinson AB, Rainwater L, Smeeding T (1995) Income Distribution in OECD Countries,
Evidence from the Luxemburg Income Study. OECD, Paris
Bauer T, Pereira PT, Vogler M, Zimmermann KF (2002) Portuguese Migrants in the German
Labor Market: Selection and Performance. International Migration Review 36 (2): 467–491
Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics
Male Female
NL NZ_mig NZ_nat NL NZ_mig NZ_nat
Age 38.484 46.293 34.565 36.278 43.858 34.826
(11.314) (12.701) (13.897) (11.109) (12.848) (13.885)
Years since migration 23.543 21.528
(11.310) (11.218)
Hours of work 39.401 45.623 45.396 27.665 32.695 34.384
(7.423) (12.624) (12.805) (13.510) (16.484) (14.725)
Selfemployed 0.065 0.349 0.220 0.047 0.211 0.100
(0.246) (0.477) (0.414) (0.211) (0.408) (0.300)
Not in labor force 0.096 0.127 0.129 0.511 0.448 0.367
(0.294) (0.333) (0.335) (0.500) (0.497) (0.482)
Unemployed 0.050 0.026 0.046 0.053 0.044 0.059
(0.219) (0.160) (0.210) (0.225) (0.205) (0.236)
Part-time work 0.039 0.041 0.041 0.204 0.188 0.160
(0.194) (0.197) (0.197) (0.403) (0.390) (0.367)
Full-time work 0.815 0.806 0.784 0.231 0.320 0.414
(0.388) (0.395) (0.411) (0.422) (0.466) (0.493)
No qualiﬁcation 0.088 0.214 0.404 0.091 0.280 0.440
(0.283) (0.410) (0.491) (0.287) (0.449) (0.496)
University qualiﬁcation 0.191 0.067 0.064 0.120 0.037 0.039
(0.393) (0.250) (0.244) (0.325) (0.188) (0.194)
Years of schooling 11.423 10.486 9.324 10.954 9.693 8.901
(2.688) (2.736) (3.068) (2.405) (2.624) (2.845)
Logarithmic income 7.677 9.718 9.552 6.909 8.676 8.747
(0.372) (0.720) (0.879) (0.680) (1.129) (1.109)
Married 0.831 0.807 0.572 0.806 0.804 0.608
(0.375) (0.394) (0.495) (0.396) (0.397) (0.488)
Professional 0.284 0.232 0.186 0.318 0.214 0.198
(0.451) (0.422) (0.389) (0.466) (0.410) (0.398)
Service worker 0.289 0.206 0.227 0.600 0.542 0.600
(0.453) (0.404) (0.419) (0.490) (0.498) (0.490)
Agricultural worker 0.031 0.139 0.144 0.012 0.122 0.082
(0.174) (0.346) (0.351) (0.109) (0.328) (0.274)
Blue Collar worker 0.396 0.423 0.443 0.070 0.122 0.120
(0.489) (0.494) (0.497) (0.256) (0.327) (0.325)
Number of observations 2027 11677 43795 2067 8519 43745
Table gives the sample means; standard deviations in parentheses.
Sources: New Zealand Census 1986 (see Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998); OSA 1986 (avail-
able from OSA, Tilburg University).
704 J. Hartog, R. Winkelmann
Berg G van den (1990) Search Behaviour, Transitions to Non-Participation and the Duration of
Unemployment. Economic Journal 100:842–865
Berg G van den (1999) Duration models: speciﬁcations, identiﬁcation and multiple durantions.
In: Heckmann JJ and Lazear E (eds) Handbook of Econometrics. North-Holland,
Amsterdam
Borjas G (1987) Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants. American Economic Review
77(4):531–553
Borjas G (1999) The economic analysis of immigration. In: Ashenfelter O, Card D (eds)
Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol 3, Chapt 28. North-Holland, Amsterdam
Bjo¨rklund A, Mofﬁtt RM (1987) The estimation of wage gains and welfare gains in self-selection.
Review of Economics and Statistics 69(1):42–49
Chiswick BR (2000) Are immigrants favorably self-selected? An economic analysis, Bonn: IZA
Discussion Paper 131
Dixon S (1998) Growth in the dispersion of earnings: 1984–97. Labour Market Bulletin (1 & 2):
71–107
Dustman C, Kirchkamp O (2001) The Optimal Migration Duration and Activity Choice after
Re-migration, Bonn: IZA Discussion Paper 266
Elich JH, Blauw PW (1981) . . . . En toch terug, Onderzoeksrapport Erasmus Universiteit
Rotterdam, FEW Sociologie
Gottschalk P, Smeeding T (1997) Cross-national comparisons of earnings and income inequality.
Journal of Economic Literature 35(2):633–687
Gould J (1982) The rake’s progress: The New Zealand economy since 1945. Hodder and
Stoughton, Auckland
Hartog J, Veenbergen JG (1978) Dutch treat: long-run changes in income inequality in the
Netherlands. De Economist 126(4):521–549
Narendranathan W (1993) Job search in a dynamic environment – an empirical analysis. Oxford
Economic Papers 45:1–22
Priemus B (1997) Naar de andere kant van de wereld, doctoraal stageverslag Politicologie,
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Puhani P (2000) The Heckman Correction for Sample Selection and Its Critique. Journal of
Economic Surveys 14:53–68
Quandt R (1972) Methods for Estimating Switching Regressions. Journal of the American
Statistical Association 67:338, 306–310
Røed M (2000) The return to return migration – an empirical approach, Oslo: Institute for Social
Research
Roy AD (1950) The Distribution of Earnings and Individual Output. Economic Journal 60(3):
489–505
Roy AD (1951) Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings. Oxford Economic Papers 3:
135–146
Schwarz A (1976) Migration, age and education. Journal of Political Economy 84(4, part 1):
701–719
Wetzels C (1999) Squeezing birth into working life. Ph.D. dissertation Universiteit van Amster-
dam, Tinbergen Institute Research Series 194
Winkelmann R (2000) The Labor Market Performance of European Immigrants in New Zealand
in the 1980s and 1990s. International Migration Review 34(1):33–58
Winkelmann R (2001a) Immigration Policies and their Impact: The case of New Zealand and
Australia. In: Djajic S (ed) International Migration: Trends, Policy, and Economic Impact,
Routledge, 1–20
Winkelmann R (2001b) Correctly Interpreting the Results from a Log-Linear Regression under
Heteroskedasticty – Methods and an Application to the Relative Wages of Immigrants,
(in German) Jahrbu¨cher fu¨r Nationalo¨konomie und Statistik 221:418–431
Winkelmann L, Winkelmann R (1998) Immigrants in the New Zealand labour market: A study of
their labour market outcomes, Report for the New Zealand Department of Labour
Comparing migrants to non-migrants 705
